CARL G. JUNG

ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY

Carl G. Jung, the first president of the Psychoanalytical Society, severed relations with the Freudian camp in 1912 by establishing his own school of psychological thought which he named ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY. Several psychological concepts distinguish the thinking of his school from Freudian psychoanalysis: the belief in a *collective unconscious* as well as a personal unconscious, *i.e.*, a universal or unconscious mind which is shared by all members of the human race; the belief in two basic personality types, extraverts and introverts; the belief in archetypes, complexes, and symbols; the belief that man is telically as well as causally motivated; the belief that man has noble or divine impulses as well as animal impulses; the repudiation of the Freudian belief in pansexualism; and the belief in the soul of man.

Jung, who was born in Switzerland in 1875 and died in 1961, spent most of his life in the country of his birth. The son of a minister, he trained as a medical doctor at the University of Basel and entered personality theory from the field of psychiatry, where he had specialized in the treat-

ment of schizophrenia. He studied six months with the noted Janet and was Bleuler's assistant at the mental hospital at Burghölzli in Zurich. Jung's wife, Emma Rauschenbach, also a Swiss, was an analyst in her own right.

During World War I Jung served in the Swiss army as a medical officer in charge of British prisoners of war. In 1933 he became head of the General Medical Society for Psychotherapy, and he was co-editor of its journal from 1936 to 1940, when he resigned from both posts. From 1933 to 1941 he was Professor of Psychology at Zurich, and in 1944 Professor of Medical Psychology at Basel.

Jung's work profited from his monumental background of cultural learning. His researches took him the world over: in 1921 he made a trip to North Africa to observe the habits and psychology of the natives; and in 1924-1925 he made a similar trip to Arizona and New Mexico to study the behavior and thinking of the Pueblo Indians. In 1932 he was the recipient of the Literary Prize of the city of Zurich, and in 1937 he delivered the Terry Lectures at Yale University. His achievements have been recognized by academic communities from America to India, and he holds honorary degrees from Harvard University, Oxford University, the University of Calcutta, the University of Geneva, Banaras Hindu University, and the University of Allahabad, India. When Oxford University conferred upon him the honorary D.Sc., he became the first psychologist to receive such an honor in England.

Jung is remembered as a genial man, brown-eyed, white-haired, and ruddy-complexioned, tall and fine-looking, with an equally impressive personality. By way of recreation he enjoyed walking in the nearby Swiss mountains, stone-carving, and swimming in the Lake of Zurich. Upon the lintel over the door of his home in Küsnacht there hung a sign which read, *Vocatus at ave non vocatus deus aderit* (called or not called, God is present), a most appropriate motto for the religious man that Jung was.

The English-speaking world has been provided with *The Collected Works of Carl G. Jung*, published by the Bollingen Foundation, under the editorship of Herbert Read, Michael Fordham, and Gerhard Adler, and translated by R. F. C. Hull.

ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY VERSUS PSYCHOANALYSIS[1]

As is well known, the merit of discovering the new analytical method of general psychology belongs to Professor Freud of Vienna. His original views have had to undergo many important modifications, some of them owing to the work done at Zurich, in spite of the fact that he himself is far from agreeing with the standpoint of this school.

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The Viennese School adopts an exclusively sexualistic standpoint while that of the Zurich School is symbolistic. The Viennese School interprets the psychological symbol semiotically, as a sign or token of certain primitive psychosexual processes. Its method is analytical and causal. The Zurich School recognizes the scientific possibility of such a conception but denies its exclusive validity, for it does not interpret the psychological symbol semiotically only but also symbolistically, that is, it attributes a positive value to the symbol.

The value of the symbol does not depend merely on historical causes; its chief importance lies in the fact that it has a meaning for the actual present and for the future, in their psychological aspects. For the Zurich School the symbol is not merely a sign of something repressed and concealed, but is at the same time an attempt to comprehend and to point the way to the further psychological development of the individual. Thus we add a prospective meaning to the retrospective value of the symbol.

The method of the Zurich School, therefore, is not only analytical and causal but synthetic and prospective, in recognition of the fact that the human mind is characterized by *fines* (aims) as well as by *causae*. This deserves particular emphasis, because there are two types of psychology, the one following the principle of hedonism, the other the power principle. The philosophical counterpart of the former type is scientific materialism and of the latter the philosophy of Nietzsche. The principle of the Freudian theory is hedonism, while the theory of Adler (one of Freud's earliest personal pupils) is founded on the power principle.

The Zurich School, recognizing the existence of these two types (also remarked by the late Professor William James), considers that the views of Freud and Adler are one-sided and valid only within the limits of their corresponding type. Both principles exist in every individual though not in equal proportions.

[1] "Prefaces to 'Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology,'" in *Freud and Psychoanalysis*, vol. IV of COLLECTED WORKS, ed. Herbert Read *et al.*, trans. R. F. C. Hull. Bollingen Series XX; New York: Pantheon, 1961), from pp. 290-97.

Thus, it is obvious that every psychological symbol has two aspects and should be interpreted in accordance with both principles. Freud and Adler interpret in the analytical and causal way, reducing to the infantile and primitive. Thus with Freud the conception of the "aim" is the fulfillment of the wish, while with Adler it is the usurpation of power. In their practical analytical work both authors take the standpoint which brings to light only infantile and grossly egoistic aims.

The Zurich School is convinced that within the limits of a diseased mental attitude the psychology is such as Freud and Adler describe. It is, indeed, just on account of such an impossible and childish psychology that the individual is in a state of inner dissociation and hence neurotic. The Zurich School, therefore, in agreement with them so far, also reduces the psychological symbol (the phantasy-products of the patient) to his fundamental infantile hedonism or infantile desire for power. Freud and Adler content themselves with the result of mere reduction, which accords with their scientific biologism and naturalism.

But here a very important question arises. Can man obey the fundamental and primitive impulses of his nature without gravely injuring himself or his fellow beings? He cannot assert either his sexual desire or his desire for power unlimitedly in the face of limits which are very restrictive. The Zurich School has in view the end-result of analysis, and it regards the fundamental thoughts and impulses of the unconscious as symbols, indicative of a definite line of future development. We must admit, however, that there is *no scientific justification* for such a procedure, because our present-day science is based wholly on causality. But causality is only one principle, and psychology cannot be exhausted by causal methods only, because the mind lives by aims as well. Besides this controversial philosophical argument we have another of much greater value in favour of our hypothesis, namely that of *vital necessity*. It is impossible to live according to the promptings of infantile hedonism or according to a childish desire for power. If these are to be given a place they must be taken symbolically. Out of the symbolic applications of infantile trends there evolves an attitude which may be termed philosophic or religious, and these terms characterize sufficiently well the lines of the individual's further development. The individual is not just a fixed and unchangeable complex of psychological facts; he is also an extremely variable entity. By an exclusive reduction to causes the primitive trends of a personality are reinforced; this is helpful only when these primitive tendencies are balanced by a recognition of their symbolic values. Analysis and reduction lead to causal truth; this by itself does not help us to live but only induces resignation and hopelessness. On the other hand, the recognition of the intrinsic value of a symbol leads to constructive truth and helps us to live; it inspires hopefulness and furthers the possibility of future development.

The functional-importance of the symbol is clearly shown in the

history of civilization. For thousands of years the religious symbol proved a most efficacious device in the moral education of mankind. Only a prejudiced mind could deny such an obvious fact. Concrete values cannot take the place of the symbol; only new and more effective symbols can be substituted for those that are antiquated and outworn and have lost their efficacy through the progress of intellectual analysis and understanding. The further development of the individual can be brought about only by means of symbols which represent something far in advance of himself and whose intellectual meanings cannot yet be grasped entirely. The individual unconscious produces such symbols, and they are of the greatest possible value in the moral development of the personality.

Man almost invariably has philosophic and religious views concerning the meaning of the world and of his own life. There are some who are proud to have none. But these are exceptions outside the common path of mankind; they lack an important function which has proved itself to be indispensible to the human psyche.

In such cases we find in the unconscious, instead of modern symbolism, an antiquated, archaic view of the world and of life. If a necessary psychological function is not represented in the sphere of consciousness it exists in the unconscious in the form of an archaic or embryonic prototype.

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It cannot be disputed that, psychologically speaking, we are living and working day by day according to the principle of directed aim or purpose as well as that of causality. A psychological theory must necessarily adapt itself to this fact. What is plainly directed towards a goal cannot be given an exclusively causalistic explanation, otherwise we should be led to the conclusion expressed in Moleschott's famous dictum: "Man ist was er isst" (Man *is* what he eats). We must always bear in mind that *causality is a point of view. . . . Finality is also a point of view,* and it is empirically justified by the existence of series of events in which the causal connection is indeed evident *but the meaning of which only becomes intelligible in terms of end-products (final effects).* Ordinary life furnishes the best instances of this. The causal explanation must be mechanistic if we are not to postulate a metaphysical entity as first cause. For instance, if we adopt Freud's sexual theory and assign primary importance psychologically to the function of the genital glands, the brain is seen as an appendage of the genital glands. If we approach the Viennese concept of sexuality, with all its vague omnipotence, in a strictly scientific manner and reduce it to its physiological basis, we shall arrive at the first cause, according to which psychic life is for the most, or the most important part, tension and relaxation of the genital glands. If we assume for the moment that this mechanistic explanation

is "true," it would be the sort of truth which is exceptionally tiresome and rigidly limited in scope. A similar statement would be that the genital glands cannot function without adequate *nourishment*, the inference being that sexuality is a subsidiary function of nutrition. The truth of this forms an important chapter in the biology of the lower forms of life.

But if we wish to work in a really psychological way we shall want to know the *meaning* of psychological phenomena. After learning what kinds of steel the various parts of a locomotive are made of, and what iron-works and mines they come from, we do not really know anything about the locomotive's *function*, that is to say its *meaning*. But "function" as conceived by modern science is by no means exclusively a causal concept; it is especially a final or "teleological" one. For it is impossible to consider the psyche from the causal standpoint only; we are obliged to consider it also from the final point of view.

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As a matter of fact, modern physics has necessarily been converted from the idea of pure mechanism to the finalistic concept of the conservation of energy, because the mechanistic explanation recognizes only reversible processes whereas the actual truth is that the processes of nature are irreversible. This fact led to the concept of an energy that tends towards relief of tension and hence towards a definite final state.

Obviously, I consider both these points of view necessary, the causal as well as the final, but would at the same time stress that since Kant's time we have come to realize that the two viewpoints are not antagonistic if they are regarded as regulative principles of thought and not as constituent principles of the process of nature itself.

THE COLLECTIVE UNCONSCIOUS

The Personal and Collective Unconscious

A[2] more or less superficial layer of the unconscious is undoubtedly personal. I call it the *personal unconscious*. But this personal unconscious rests upon a deeper layer, which does not derive from personal experience and is not a personal acquisition but is inborn. This deeper layer I call the *collective unconscious*. I have chosen the term "collective" because this part of the unconscious is not individual but universal; in contrast to the personal psyche, it has contents and modes of behaviour that are more or less the same everywhere and in all individuals. It is, in other words, identical in all men and thus constitutes a common psychic

[2] "Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious," in *Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious* (1959), vol. IX, pt. 1 of COLLECTED WORKS, *op. cit.*, from pp. 3-4.

substrate of a suprapersonal nature which is present in every one of us.

Psychic existence can be recognized only by the presence of contents that are *capable of consciousness*. We can therefore speak of an unconscious only in so far as we are able to demonstrate its contents. The contents of the personal unconscious are chiefly the *feeling-toned complexes*, as they are called; they constitute the personal and private side of psychic life. The contents of the collective unconscious, on the other hand, are known as *archetypes*.

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The[3] collective unconscious is a part of the psyche which can be negatively distinguished from a personal unconscious by the fact that it does not, like the latter, owe its existence to personal experience and consequently is not a personal acquisition. While the personal unconscious is made up essentially of contents which have at one time been conscious but which have disappeared from consciousness through having been forgotten or repressed, the contents of the collective unconscious have never been in consciousness, and therefore have never been individually acquired, but owe their existence exclusively to heredity. Whereas the personal unconscious consists of the most part of *complexes*, the content of the collective unconscious is made up essentially of *archetypes*.

The concept of the archetype, which is an indispensable part of the idea of the collective unconscious, indicates the existence of definite forms in the psyche which seem to be present always and everywhere. Mythological research calls them "motifs"; in the psychology of primitives they correspond to Lévy-Bruhl's concept of "représentations collectives," and in the field of comparative religion they have been defined by Hubert and Mauss as "categories of the imagination." Adolf Bastian long ago called them "elementary" or "primordial thoughts." From these references it should be clear enough that my idea of archetype—literally a pre-existent form—does not stand alone but is something that is recognized and named in other fields of knowledge.

My thesis, then, is as follows: In addition to our immediate consciousness, which is of a thoroughly personal nature and which we believe to be the only empirical psyche (even if we tack on the personal unconscious as an appendix), there exists a second psychic system of a collective, universal, and impersonal nature which is identical in all individuals. The collective unconscious does not develop individually but is inherited. It consists of pre-existent forms, the archetypes, which can only become conscious secondarily and which give definite form to certain psychic contents.

[3]"The Concept of the Collective Unconscious," in *Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious*, *ibid.*, from pp. 42ff.

Instincts and the Collective Unconscious

Medical psychology, growing as it did out of professional practice, insists on the *personal* nature of the psyche. By this I mean the views of Freud and Adler. It is a *psychology of the person*, and its aetiological or causal factors are regarded almost wholly as personal in nature. Nonetheless, even this psychology is based on certain general biological factors, for instance on the sexual instinct or on the urge for self-assertion, which are by no means merely personal peculiarities. It is forced to do this because it lays claim to being an explanatory science. Neither of these views would deny the existence of *a priori* instincts common to man and animals alike, or that they have a significant influence on personal psychology. Yet instincts are impersonal, universally distributed, hereditary factors of a dynamic or motivating character, which very often fail so completely to reach consciousness that modern psychotherapy is faced with the task of helping the patient to become conscious of them. Moreover, the instincts are not vague and indefinite by nature, but are specifically formed motive forces which, long before there is any consciousness, and in spite of any degree of consciousness later on, pursue their inherent goals. Consequently they form very close analogies to the archetypes, so close, in fact, that there is good reason for supposing that the archetypes are the unconscious images of the instincts themselves, in other words, that they are *patterns of instinctual behaviour.*

THE EGO[4]

Investigations of the psychology of the unconscious confronted me with facts which required the formulation of new concepts. One of these concepts is the *self.* The entity so denoted is not meant to take the place of the one that has always been known as the *ego*, but includes it in a supraordinate concept. We understand the ego as the complex factor to which all conscious contents are related. It forms, as it were, the centre of the field of consciousness; and, in so far as this comprises the empirical personality, the ego is the subject of all personal acts of consciousness. The relation of a psychic content to the ego forms the criterion of its consciousness, for no content can be conscious unless it is represented to a subject.

With this definition we have described and delimited the *scope* of the subject. Theoretically, no limits can be set to the field of consciousness, since it is capable of indefinite extension. Empirically, however, it

[4]"The Ego," in *Aion: Researches into the Phenomenology of the Self* (1959), vol. IX, pt. 2 of COLLECTED WORKS, *op. cit.*, from pp. 3-6.

always finds its limit when it comes up against the *unknown*. This consists of everything we do not know, which, therefore, is not related to the ego as the centre of the field of consciousness. The unknown falls into two groups of objects: those which are outside and can be experienced by the senses, and those which are inside and are experienced immediately. The first group comprises the unknown in the outer world; the second the unknown in the inner world. We call this latter territory the *unconscious*.

The ego, as a specific content of consciousness, is not a simple or elementary factor but a complex one which, as such, cannot be described exhaustively. Experience shows that it rests on two seemingly different bases: the *somatic* and the *psychic*. The somatic basis is inferred from the totality of endosomatic perceptions, which for their part are already of a psychic nature and are associated with the ego, and are therefore conscious. They are produced by endosomatic stimuli, only some of which cross the threshold of consciousness. A considerable proportion of these stimuli occur unconsciously, that is, subliminally.

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The somatic basis of the ego consists, then, of conscious and unconscious factors. The same is true of the psychic basis: on the one hand the ego rests on the *total field of consciousness*, and on the other, on the *sum total of unconscious contents*. These fall into three groups: first, temporarily subliminal contents that can be reproduced voluntarily (memory); second, unconscious contents that cannot be reproduced voluntarily; third, contents that are not capable of becoming conscious at all. Group two can be inferred from the spontaneous irruption of subliminal contents into consciousness. Group three is hypothetical; it is a logical inference from the facts underlying group two. This contains contents which have *not yet* irrupted into consciousness, or which never will.

When I said that the ego "rests" on the total field of consciousness I do not mean that it *consists* of this. Were that so, it would be indistinguishable from the field of consciousness as a whole. The ego is only the latter's point of reference, grounded on and limited by the somatic factor described above.

Although its bases are in themselves relatively unknown and unconscious, the ego is a conscious factor par excellence. It is even acquired, empirically speaking, during the individual's lifetime. It seems to arise in the first place from the collision between the somatic factor and the environment, and, once established as a subject, it goes on developing from further collisions with the outer world and the inner.

Despite the unlimited extent of its bases, the ego is never more and never less than consciousness as a whole. As a conscious factor the ego could, theoretically at least, be described completely. But this would never amount to more than a picture of the *conscious personality*: all

those features which are unknown or unconscious to the subject would be missing. A total picture would have to include these. But a total description of the personality is, even in theory, absolutely impossible, because the unconscious portion of it cannot be grasped cognitively. This unconscious portion, as experience has abundantly shown, is by no means unimportant. On the contrary, the most decisive qualities in a person are often unconscious and can be perceived only by others, or have to be laboriously discovered with outside help.

Clearly, then, the personality as a total phenomenon does not coincide with the ego, that is, with the conscious personality, but forms an entity that has to be distinguished from the ego. Naturally the need to do this is incumbent only on a psychology that reckons with the fact of the unconscious, but for such a psychology the distinction is of paramount importance. Even for jurisprudence it should be of some importance whether certain psychic facts are conscious or not—for instance, in adjudging the question of responsibility.

I have suggested calling the total personality which, though present, cannot be fully known, the self. The ego is, by definition, subordinate to the self and is related to it like a part to the whole.... Since it is the point of reference for the field of consciousness, the ego is the subject of all successful attempts at adaptation so far as these are achieved by the will. The ego therefore has a significant part to play in the psychic economy. Its position there is so important that there are good grounds for the prejudice that the ego is the centre of the personality, and that the field of consciousness is the psyche *per se*.

THE SHADOW[5]

Whereas the contents of the personal unconscious are acquired during the individual's lifetime, the contents of the collective unconscious are invariably archetypes that were present from the beginning. Their relation to the instincts has been discussed elsewhere. The archetypes most clearly characterized from the empirical point of view are those which have the most frequent and the most disturbing influence on the ego. These are the *shadow*, the *anima*, and the *animus*. The most accessible of these, and the easiest to experience, is the shadow, for its nature can in large measure be inferred from the contents of the personal unconscious. The only exceptions to this rule are those rather rare cases where the positive qualities of the personality are repressed, and the ego in consequence plays an essentially negative or unfavorable role.

[5]"The Shadow," in *Aion*, *ibid.*, from pp. 8-10.

The shadow is a moral problem that challenges the whole ego-personality, for no one can become conscious of the shadow without considerable moral effort. To become conscious of it involves recognizing the dark aspects of the personality as present and real. This act is the essential condition for any kind of self-knowledge, and it therefore, as a rule, meets with considerable resistance. Indeed, self-knowledge as a psychotherapeutic measure frequently requires much painstaking work extending over a long period.

Closer examination of the dark characteristics—that is, the inferiorities constituting the shadow—reveals that they have an *emotional* nature, a kind of autonomy, and accordingly an obsessive or, better, possessive quality. Emotion, incidentally, is not an activity of the individual but something that happens to him. Affects occur usually where adaptation is weakest, and at the same time they reveal the reason for its weakness, namely a certain degree of inferiority and the existence of a lower level of personality. On this lower level with its uncontrolled or scarcely controlled emotions one behaves more or less like a primitive, who is not only the passive victim of his affects but also singularly incapable of moral judgment.

Although, with insight and good will, the shadow can to some extent be assimilated into the conscious personality, experience shows that there are certain features which offer the most obstinate resistance to moral control and prove almost impossible to influence. These resistances are usually bound up with *projections*, which are not recognized as such, and their recognition is a moral achievement beyond the ordinary. While some traits peculiar to the shadow can be recognized without too much difficulty as one's own personal qualities, in this case both insight and good will are unavailing because the cause of the emotion appears to lie, beyond all possibility of doubt, in the *other person*. No matter how obvious it may be to the neutral observer that it is a matter of projections, there is little hope that the subject will perceive this himself. He must be convinced that he throws a very long shadow before he is willing to withdraw his emotionally-toned projections from their object.

Let us suppose that a certain individual shows no inclination whatever to recognize his projections. The projection-making factor then has a free hand and can realize its object—if it has one—or bring about some other situation characteristic of its power. As we know, it is not the conscious subject but the unconscious which does the projecting. Hence one meets with projections, one does not make them. The effect of projection is to isolate the subject from his environment, since instead of a real relation to it there is now only an illusory one. Projections change the world into the replica of one's own unknown face. In the last analysis, therefore, they lead to an autoerotic or autistic condition in which one dreams a world whose reality remains forever unattainable. The resultant *sentiment d'incomplétude* and the still worse feeling of

sterility are in their turn explained by projection as the malevolence of the environment, and by means of this vicious circle the isolation is intensified. The more projections are thrust in between the subject and the environment, the harder it is for the ego to see through its illusions.

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It is often tragic to see how blatantly a man bungles his own life and the lives of others yet remains totally incapable of seeing how much the whole tragedy originates in himself, and how he continually feeds it and keeps it going. Not *consciously*, of course—for consciously he is engaged in bewailing and cursing a faithless world that recedes further and further into the distance. Rather, it is an unconscious factor which spins the illusions that veil his world. And what is being spun is a cocoon, which in the end will completely envelop him.

One might assume that projections like these, which are so very difficult if not impossible to dissolve, would belong to the realm of the shadow—that is, to the negative side of the personality. This assumption becomes untenable after a certain point, because the symbols that then appear no longer refer to the same but to the opposite sex, in a man's case to a woman and vice versa. The source of projections is no longer the shadow—which is always of the same sex as the subject—but a contrasexual figure. Here we meet the animus of a woman and the anima of a man, two corresponding archetypes whose autonomy and unconsciousness explain the stubbornness of their projections. Though the shadow is a motif as well known to mythology as anima and animus, it represents first and foremost the personal unconscious, and its content can therefore be made conscious without too much difficulty. In this it differs from anima and animus, for whereas the shadow can be seen through and recognized fairly easily, the anima and animus are much further away from consciousness and in normal circumstances are seldom if ever realized. With a little self-criticism one can see through the shadow—so far as its nature is personal. But when it appears as an archetype, one encounters the same difficulties as with anima and animus. In other words, it is quite within the bounds of possibility for a man to recognize the relative evil of his nature, but it is a rare and shattering experience for him to gaze into the face of absolute evil.

THE ANIMA AND ANIMUS[6]

What, then, is this projection-making factor? The East calls it the "Spinning Woman"[a]—Maya, who creates illusion by her dancing. . . . In

[6]"The Syzygy: Anima and Animus," in *Aion*, *ibid.*, from pp. 11ff.

[a]I have defined the anima as a personification of the unconscious.

the case of the son, the projection-making factor is identical with the mother-imago, and this is consequently taken to be the real mother. The projection can only be dissolved when the son sees that in the realm of his psyche there is an image not only of the mother but of the daughter, the sister, the beloved, the heavenly goddess, and the chthonic Baubo. Every mother and every beloved is forced to become the carrier and embodiment of this omnipresent and ageless image, which corresponds to the deepest reality in a man. It belongs to him, this perilous image of Woman; she stands for the loyalty which in the interests of life he must sometimes forgo; she is the much needed compensation for the risks, struggles, sacrifices that all end in disappointment; she is the solace for all the bitterness of life. . . . This image is "My Lady Soul," as Spitteler called her. I have suggested instead the term "anima," as indicating something specific, for which the expression "soul" is too general and too vague. The empirical reality summed up under the concept of the anima forms an extremely dramatic content of the unconscious.

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The projection-making factor is the anima, or rather the unconscious as represented by the anima. Whenever she appears, in dreams, visions, and fantasies, she takes on personified form, thus demonstrating that the factor she embodies possesses all the outstanding characteristics of a feminine being. She is not an invention of the conscious, but a spontaneous product of the unconscious. Nor is she a substitute figure for the mother. On the contrary, there is every likelihood that the numinous qualities which make the mother-imago so dangerously powerful derive from the collective archetype of the anima, which is carnated anew in every male child.

Since the anima is an archetype that is found in men, it is reasonable to suppose that an equivalent archetype must be present in women; for just as the man is compensated by a feminine element, so woman is compensated by a masculine one. . . . Just as the mother seems to be the first carrier of the projection-making factor for the son, so is the father for the daughter. Practical experience of these relationships is made up of many individual cases presenting all kinds of variations on the same basic theme.

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Woman is compensated by a masculine element and therefore her unconscious has, so to speak, a masculine imprint. This results in a considerable psychological difference between men and women, and accordingly I have called the projection-making factor in women the animus, which means mind or spirit. The animus corresponds to the paternal Logos just as the anima corresponds to the maternal Eros. But I do not wish or intend to give these two intuitive concepts too specific a

definition. I use Eros and Logos merely as conceptual aids to describe the fact that woman's consciousness is characterized more by the cognition associated with Logos. In men, Eros, the function of relationship, is usually less developed than Logos. In women, on the other hand, Eros is an expression of their true nature, while their Logos is often only a regrettable accident. It gives rise to misunderstandings and annoying interpretations in the family circle and among friends. This is because it consists of *opinions* instead of reflections, and by opinions I mean *a priori* assumptions that lay claim to absolute truth. Such assumptions, as everyone knows, can be extremely irritating. As the animus is partial to argument, he can best be seen at work in disputes where both parties know they are right. Men can argue in a very womanish way, too, when they are anima-possessed and have thus been transformed into the animus of their own anima. With them the question becomes one of personal vanity and touchiness (as if they were females); with women it is a question of power, whether of truth or justice or some other "ism"—for the dressmaker and hairdresser have already taken care of their vanity. The "Father" (i.e., the sum of conventional opinions) always plays a great role in female argumentation. No matter how friendly and obliging a woman's Eros may be, no logic on earth can shake her if she is ridden by the animus.

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When animus and anima meet, the animus draws his sword of power and the anima ejects her poison of illusion and seduction. The outcome need not always be negative, since the two are equally likely to fall in love (a special instance of love at first sight). The language of love is of astonishing uniformity, using the well-worn formulas with the utmost devotion and fidelity, so that once again the two partners find themselves in a banal collective situation. Yet they live in the illusion that they are related to one another in a most individual way.

In both its positive and its negative aspects the anima/animus relationship is always full of "animosity," i.e., it is emotional, and hence collective. . . . Whereas the cloud of "animosity" surrounding the man is composed chiefly of sentimentality and resentment, in woman it expresses itself in the form of opinionated views, interpretations, insinuations, and misconstructions, which all have the purpose (sometimes attained) of severing the relations between two human beings. The woman, like the man, becomes wrapped in a veil of illusions by her demon-familiar, and, as the daughter who alone understands her father, she is translated to the land of sheep, where she is put to graze by the shepherd of her soul, the animus.

Like the anima, the animus too has a positive aspect. Through the figure of the father he expresses not only conventional opinion but—equally—what we call "spirit," philosophical or religious ideas in par-

ticular, or rather the attitude resulting from them. Thus the animus of the psychopomp, a mediator between the conscious and the unconscious and a personification of the latter.

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Recapitulating, I should like to emphasize that the integration of the shadow, or the realization of the personal unconscious, marks the first stage in the analytic process, and that without it a recognition of anima and animus is impossible. The shadow can be realized only through a relation to the opposite sex, because only in such a relation do their projections become operative. The recognition of anima or animus gives rise, in a man, to a trias, one third of which is transcendent: the masculine subject, the opposing feminine subject, and the transcendent anima. With a woman the situation is reversed.

ARCHETYPES (CONTENTS OF THE COLLECTIVE UNCONSCIOUS)[7]

The term "archetype" occurs as early as Philo Judaeus, with reference to the *Imago Dei* (God-image) in man. It can also be found in Irenaeus, who says: "The creator of the world did not fashion these things directly from himself but copied them from archetypes outside himself." In the *Corpus Hermeticum*, God is called *to archetupon phos* (archetypal light). . . . "Archetype" is an explanatory paraphrase of the Platonic *eidos*. For our purposes this term is apposite and helpful, because it tells us that so far as the collective unconscious contents are concerned we are dealing with archaic or—I would say—primordial types, that is, with universal images that have existed since the remotest times. The term "représentations collectives," used by Lévy-Bruhl to denote the symbolic figures in the primitive view of the world, could easily be applied to unconscious contents as well, since it means practically the same thing. Primitive tribal lore is concerned with archetypes that have been modified in a special way. They are no longer contents of the unconscious, but have already been changed into conscious formulae taught according to tradition, generally in the form of esoteric teaching. This last is a typical means of expression for the transmission of collective contents originally derived from the unconscious.

Another well-known expression of the archetypes is myth and fairy-tale. But here too we are dealing with forms that have received a specific stamp and have been handed down through long periods of time. The

[7] "The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious," in *Aion*, *op. cit.*, pp. 4–5

term "archetype" thus applies only indirectly to the "représentations collectives," since it designates only those psychic contents which have not yet been submitted to conscious elaboration and are therefore an immediate datum of psychic experience. In this sense there is considerable difference between the archetype and the historical formula that has evolved. Especially on the higher levels of esoteric teaching the archetypes appear in a form that reveals quite unmistakably the critical and evaluating influence of conscious elaboration. Their immediate manifestation, as we encounter it in dreams and visions, is much more individual, less understandable, and more naive than myths, for example. The archetype is essentially an unconscious content that is altered by becoming conscious and by being perceived, and it takes its colour from the individual consciousness in which it happens to appear.

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Primordial Images[8]

The image is a concentrated *expression of the total psychic situation*, not merely, nor even pre-eminently, of unconscious contents pure and simple. It undoubtedly does express the contents of the unconscious, though not the whole of its contents in general, but merely those momentarily constellated. This constellation is the product of the specific activity of the unconscious on the one hand, and of the momentary conscious situation on the other: this always stimulates the activity of associated subliminal material at the same time as it also inhibits the irrelevant. Accordingly the image is equally an expression of the unconscious as of the conscious situation of the moment.

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I term the image *primordial* when it possesses an archaic character. I speak of its archaic character when the image is in striking unison with familiar mythological motives. In this case it expresses material primarily derived from the collective unconscious, while, at the same time, it indicates that the momentary conscious situation is influenced not so much from the side of the personal as from the collective.

A *personal* image has neither archaic character nor collective significance, but expresses contents of the personal unconscious and a personally conditioned, conscious situation.

The primordial image (elsewhere termed the "archetype") is always collective, *i.e.* it is at least common to entire nations or epochs. In all probability the most important mythological motives are common to all times and races; I have, in fact, demonstrated a whole series of

[8]*Psychological Types* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1923), from pp. 555ff.

motives from Grecian mythology in the dreams and phantasies of thoroughbred negroes suffering from mental disorders.

The primordial image is a mnemic deposit, an *imprint* ("engramm" – Semon), which has arisen through a condensation of innumerable, similar processes. It is primarily a precipitate or deposit, and therefore a typical basic form of a certain ever-recurring psychic experience. As a mythological motive, therefore, it is a constantly affective and continually recurring expression which is either awakened, or appropriately formulated, by certain psychic experiences. The primordial image, then, is the psychic expression of an anatomically and physiologically determined disposition. If one supports the view that a definite anatomical structure is the product of environmental conditions upon living matter, the primordial image in its constant and universal distribution corresponds with an equally universal and continuous external influence, which must, therefore, have the character of a natural law.

THE SELF[9]

We shall now turn to the question of whether the increase in self-knowledge resulting from the withdrawal of impersonal projections – in other words, the integration of the contents of the collective unconscious – exerts a specific influence on the ego-personality. To the extent that the integrated contents are *parts of the self*, we can expect this influence to be considerable. Their assimilation augments not only the area of the field of consciousness but also the importance of the ego, especially when, as usually happens, the ego lacks any critical approach to the unconscious. In that case it is easily overpowered and becomes identical with the contents that have been assimilated. In this way, for instance, a masculine consciousness comes under the influence of the anima and can even be possessed by her.

I have discussed the wider affects of the integration of unconscious contents elsewhere and can therefore omit going into details here. I should only like to mention that the more numerous and the more significant the unconscious contents which are assimilated to the ego, the closer the approximation of the ego to the self, even though this approximation must be a never-ending process. This inevitability produces an inflation of the ego, unless a critical line of demarcation is drawn between it and the unconscious figures. But this act of discrimination yields practical results only if it succeeds in fixing reasonable boundaries to the ego and in granting the figures of the unconscious – the self, anima, animus, and shadow – relative autonomy and reality of

[9] "The Self," in *Aion*, *op. cit.*, from pp. 23-24.

a psychic nature). To psychologize this reality out of existence is ineffectual, or else merely increases the inflation of the ego. One cannot dispose of facts by declaring them unreal. The projection-making factor, for instance, has undeniable reality. Anyone who insists on denying it becomes identical with it, which is not only dubious in itself but a positive danger to the well-being of the individual.

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It must be reckoned a psychic catastrophe when the *ego is assimilated by the self.* The image of wholeness then remains in the unconscious, so that on the one hand it shares the archaic nature of the unconscious and on the other finds itself in the psychically relative space-time continuum that is characteristic of the unconscious as such. Both these qualities are numinous and hence have an unlimited determining effect on ego-consciousness, which is differentiated, i.e., separated, from the unconscious and moreover exists in an absolute space and an absolute time. It is a vital necessity that this should be so. If, therefore, the ego falls for any length of time under the control of an unconscious factor, its adaptation is disturbed and the way opened for all sorts of possible accidents.

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Comparison of Self and Ego[10]

By ego, I understand a complex of representations which constitutes the centrum of my field of consciousness and appears to possess a very high degree of continuity and identity. Hence I also speak of an *ego-complex.*

The ego-complex is as much a content as it is a condition of consciousness, since a psychic element is conscious to me just in so far as it is related to my ego-complex. But, inasmuch as the ego is only the centrum of my field of consciousness, it is not identical with the totality of my psyche, being merely a complex among other complexes. Hence I discriminate between the ego and the Self, since the ego is only the subject of my consciousness, while the Self is the subject of my totality: hence it also includes the unconscious psyche. In this sense the Self would be an (ideal) factor which embraces and includes the ego. In unconscious phantasy the Self often appears as a super-ordinated or ideal personality, as Faust in relation to Goethe and Zarathustra to Nietzsche. In the effort of idealization the archaic features of the Self are represented as practically severed from the "higher" Self, as in the figure of Mephisto with Goethe or in that of Epimetheus with Spitteler.

[10] *Psychological Types, op. cit.*, p. 540.

In the Christian psychology the severance is extreme in the figures of Christ and the devil or Anti-christ; while with Nietzsche Zarathustra discovers his shadow in the "ugliest man."

THE PSYCHE, SOUL AND ANIMA[11]

I have found sufficient cause, in my investigations into the structure of the unconscious, to make a conceptual distinction between the *soul* and the *psyche*. By the psyche I understand the totality of all the psychic processes, both conscious as well as unconscious; whereas by *soul* I understand a definitely demarcated function-complex that is best characterized as a "personality."

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We have only to observe a man rather closely under varying circumstances, to discover that a transition from one milieu to another brings about a striking alteration in his personality, whereby a sharply-outlined and distinctly changed character emerges. The proverbial expression "angel abroad, and devil at home" is a formulation of the phenomenon of character-splitting derived from everyday experience. A definite milieu demands a definite attitude. Corresponding with the duration or frequency with which such a milieu-attitude is demanded, the more or less habitual it becomes. Great numbers of men of the educated classes are obliged to move in two, for the most part totally different, milieux—viz. in the family and domestic circle and in the world of affairs. These two totally different environments demand two totally different attitudes, which, in proportion to the degree of identification of the ego with the momentary attitude, produce a duplication of character. In accordance with social conditions and necessities, the social character is orientated, on the one hand by the expectations or obligations of the social milieu, and on the other by the social aims and efforts of the subject. The domestic character is, as a rule, more the product of the subject's laissez-aller indolence and emotional demands; whence it frequently happens that men who in public life are extremely energetic, bold, obstinate, wilful, and inconsiderate appear good-natured, mild, accommodating, even weak, when at home within the sphere of domesticity. Which, then, is the true character, the real personality?

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This brief consideration will show that, even in the normal individual, character-splitting is by no means an impossibility. We are, therefore,

[11] *Ibid.*, from pp. 588-97.

perfectly justified in treating the question of dissociation of personality also as a problem of normal psychology. According to my view then—to pursue the discussion—the above question should be met with a frank avowal that such a man has no real character at all, i.e. he is not *individual* but *collective*, i.e. he corresponds with general circumstance and expectations. Were he an individual, he would have but one and the same character with every variation of attitude. It would not be identical with the momentary attitude, neither could it nor would it prevent his individuality from finding expression in one state just as clearly as in another. He is an individual, of course, like every being; but an unconscious one. Through his more or less complete identification with the attitude of the moment, he at least deceives others, and also often himself, as to his real character. He puts on a *mask*, which he knows corresponds with his conscious intentions, while it also meets with the requirements and opinions of his environment, so that first one motive then the other is in the ascendant. The mask, viz. the ad hoc adopted attitude, I have called the *persona*, which was the designation given to the mask worn by actors of antiquity. A man who is identified with this mask I would call "personal" (as opposed to "individual").

Both the attitudes of the case considered above are collective personalities, which may be simply summed up under the name "persona" or "personae." I have already suggested that the real individuality is different from both. Thus, the persona is a function-complex which has come into existence for reasons of adaptation or necessary convenience, but by no means is it identical with the individuality. The function-complex of the persona is exclusively concerned with the relation to the object.

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Those cases in which the inner psychic processes appear to be entirely overlooked are lacking a typical inner attitude just as little as those who constantly overlook the outer object and the reality of facts lack a typical outer attitude. The persona of these latter, by no means infrequent, cases has the character of unrelatedness, or at times even a blind inconsiderateness, which frequently yields only to the harshest blows of fate. Not seldom, it is just those individuals whose persona is characterized by a rigid inconsiderateness and absence of relations who possess an attitude to the unconscious processes which suggests a character of extreme susceptibility. As they are inflexible and inaccessible outwardly, so are they weak, flaccid, and determinable in relation to their inner processes. In such cases, therefore, the inner attitude corresponds with an inner personality diametrically opposed and different from the outer. I know a man, for instance, who without pity blindly destroyed the happiness of those nearest to him, and yet he would interrupt his journeys when travelling on important business just to

enjoy the beauty of a forest scene glimpsed from the carriage window.... With the same justification as daily experience furnishes us for speaking of an outer personality are we also justified in assuming the existence of an inner personality. The inner personality is the manner of one's behaviour towards the inner psychic processes; it is the inner attitude, the character, that is turned towards the unconscious. I term the outer attitude, or the outer character, the *persona*, the inner attitude I term the *anima*, or *soul*. In the same degree as an attitude is habitual, is it a more or less firmly welded function-complex, with which the ego may be more or less identified. This is practically expressed in language: of a man who has an habitual attitude towards certain situations, we are accustomed to say: He is quite *another man* when doing this or that. This is a practical demonstration of the independence of the function-complex of an habitual attitude: it is as though another personality had taken possession of the individual, as "though another spirit had entered into him." The same autonomy as is so often granted to the outer attitude is also claimed by the soul or inner attitude. One of the most difficult of all educational achievements is the task of changing the outer attitude, or persona. But to change the soul is just as difficult, since its structure tends to be just as firmly welded as is that of the persona. Just as the persona is an entity, which often appears to constitute the whole character of a man, even accompanying him practically without change throughout his entire life, so the soul is also a definitely circumscribed entity, with a character which may prove unalterably firm and independent. Hence, it frequently offers itself to characterization and description.

As regards the character of the soul, my experience confirms the validity of the general principle that it maintains, on the whole, a *complementary* relation to the outer character. Experience teaches us that the soul is wont to contain all those general human qualities the conscious attitude lacks. The tyrant tormented by bad dreams, gloomy forebodings, and inner fears, is a typical figure. Outwardly inconsiderate, harsh and unapproachable, he is inwardly susceptible to every shadow, and subject to every fancy, as though he were the least independent, and the most impressionable, of men. Thus his soul contains those general human qualities of suggestibility and weakness which are wholly lacking in his outer attitude, or persona. Where the persona is intellectual, the soul is quite certainly sentimental. That the complementary character of the soul is also concerned with the sex-character is a fact which can no longer seriously be doubted. A very feminine woman has a masculine soul, and a very manly man a feminine soul. This opposition is based upon the fact that a man, for instance, is not in all things wholly masculine, but has also certain feminine traits. The more manly his outer attitude, the more will his womanly traits be effaced: these then appear in the soul. This circumstance explains why it is that the very manly men are most subject to characteristic weaknesses: their attitude

to the unconscious has a womanly weakness and impressionability. And, vice versa, it is often just the most womanly women who, in respect of certain inner things, have an extreme intractableness, obstinacy, and wilfulness; which qualities are found in such intensity only in the outer attitude of men. These are manly traits, whose exclusion from the womanly outer attitude makes them qualities of the soul. If, therefore, we speak of the *anima* of a man, we must logically speak of the *animus* of a woman, if we are to give the soul of a woman its right name. Whereas logic and objective reality commonly prevail in the outer attitude of man, or are at least regarded as an ideal, in the case of woman it is feeling. But in the soul the relations are reversed: inwardly it is the man who feels, and the woman who reflects. Hence man's liability to total despair, while the woman can always find comfort and hope; hence man is more liable to put an end to himself than woman. However prone a woman may be to fall a victim to social circumstances, as in prostitution for instance, a man is equally delivered over to impulses from the unconscious in the form of alcoholism and other vices.

As regards the general human characters, the character of the soul may be deduced from that of the persona. Everything which should normally be in the outer attitude, but is decidedly wanting there, will invariably be found in the inner attitude. This is a basic rule, which my experience has borne out again and again. But, as regards individual qualities, nothing can be deduced about them in this way. We can be certain that, when a man is identical with his persona, the individual qualities are associated with the soul. It is this association which gives rise to the symbol, so often appearing in dreams, of the soul's pregnancy; this symbol has its source in the primordial image of the hero-birth. The child that is to be born signifies the individuality, which, though existing, is not yet conscious. Hence in the same way as the persona, which expresses one's adaptation to the milieu, is as a rule strongly influenced and shaped by the milieu, so the soul is just as profoundly moulded by the unconscious and its qualities. Just as the persona, almost necessarily, takes on primitive traits in a primitive milieu, so the soul assumes the archaic characters of the unconscious as well as its prospective, symbolic character. Whence arise the "pregnant" and "creative" qualities of the inner attitude. Identity with the persona automatically conditions an unconscious identity with the soul, because, when the subject or ego is not differentiated from the persona, it can have no conscious relation to the processes of the unconscious. Hence it *is* these processes: it is identical with them. The man who is unconditionally his outer role therewith delivers himself over unquestionably to the inner processes, i.e. he will even frustrate his outer role by absolute inner necessity, reducing it *ad absurdum*. A steady holding to the individual line is thereby excluded, and his life runs its course in inevitable opposition. Moreover, in such a case the soul is always

projected into a corresponding, real object, with which a relation of almost absolute dependence exists. Every reaction proceeding from this object has an immediate, inwardly arresting effect upon the subject. Tragic ties are frequently found in this way (Soul-image).

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The soul-image is a definite image among those produced by the unconscious. Just as the persona, or outer attitude, is represented in dreams by the images of certain persons who possess the outstanding qualities of the persona in especially marked form, so the soul, the inner attitude of the unconscious, is similarly represented by definite persons whose particular qualities correspond with those of the soul. Such an image is called a "soul-image." Occasionally these images are quite unknown or mythological figures. With men the soul, i.e. the anima, is usually figured by the unconscious in the person of a woman; with women it is a man. In every case where the individuality is unconscious, and therefore associated with the soul, the soul-image has the character of the same sex.

Two Psychological Types

Extraversion[12]

Extraversion means an outward-turning of the libido. With this concept I denote a manifest relatedness of subject to object in the sense of a positive movement of subjective interest towards the object. Everyone in the state of extraversion thinks, feels, and acts in relation to the object, and moreover in a direct and clearly observable fashion, so that no doubt can exist about his positive dependence upon the object. In a sense, therefore, extraversion is an outgoing transference of interest from the subject to the object. If it is an intellectual extraversion, the subject thinks himself into the object; if a feeling extraversion, then the subject feels himself into the object. The state of extraversion means a strong, if not exclusive, determination by the object. One should speak of an *active* extraversion when deliberately willed, and of a *passive* extraversion when the object compels it, i.e. attracts the interest of the subject of its own accord, even against the latter's intention. Should the state of extraversion become habitual, the *extraverted type* appears.

Introversion[13]

Introversion means a turning inwards of the libido whereby a negative relation of subject to object is expressed. Interest does not move

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 542-43.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 567.

towards the object, but recedes towards the subject. Everyone whose attitude is introverted thinks, feels, and acts in a way that clearly demonstrates that the subject is the chief factor of motivation while the object at most receives only a secondary value. Introversion may possess either a more intellectual or more emotional character, just as it can be characterized by either intuition or sensation. Introversion is *active*, when the subject *wills* a certain seclusion in face of the object; it is *passive* when the subject is unable to restore again to the object the libido which is streaming back from it. When introversion is habitual, one speaks of an *introverted type*.

THE FOUR FUNCTIONS[14]

By psychological function I understand a certain form of psychic activity that remains theoretically the same under varying circumstances. From the energic standpoint a function is a phenomenal form of libido which theoretically remains constant, in much the same way as physical force can be considered as the form or momentary manifestation of physical energy. I distinguish four basic functions in all, two rational and two irrational—viz. *thinking* and *feeling*, *sensation* and *intuition*.

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I differentiate these functions from one another, because they are neither mutually relatable nor mutually reducible. The principle of thinking, for instance, is absolutely different from the principle of feeling, and so forth. I make a capital distinction between this concept of function and phantasy-activity, or reverie, because, to my mind, phantasying is a peculiar form of activity which can manifest itself in all the four functions.

In my view, both will and attention are entirely secondary psychic phenomena.

Thinking[15]

Thinking is that psychological function which, in accordance with its own laws, brings given presentations into conceptual connection. It is an apperceptive activity and, as such, must be differentiated into *active* and *passive* thought-activity. Active thinking is an act of will, passive thinking an occurrence. In the former case, I submit representation to a

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 547.
[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 611-12.

deliberate act of judgment; in the latter case, conceptual connections establish themselves, and judgments are formed which may even contradict my aim—they may lack all harmony with my conscious objective, hence also, for me, any feeling of direction, although by an act of active apperception I may subsequently come to a recognition of their directedness. Active thinking would correspond, therefore, with my idea of directed thinking. Passive thinking was inadequately characterized in my previous work as "phantasying." To-day I would term it *intuitive* thinking. . . .

The faculty of directed thinking, I term *intellect:* the faculty of passive, or undirected, thinking, I term *intellectual* intuition. Furthermore, I describe directed thinking or intellect as the *rational* function, since it arranges the representations under concepts in accordance with the presuppositions of my conscious rational norm. Undirected thinking, or intellectual intuition, on the contrary is, in my view, an *irrational* function, since it criticizes and arranges the representations according to norms that are unconscious to me and consequently not appreciated as reasonable. . . . Thinking that is regulated by feeling, I do not regard as intuitive thinking, but as thought dependent upon feeling; it does not follow its own logical principle, but is subordinated to the principle of feeling. In such thinking the laws of logic are only ostensibly present; in reality they are suspended in favour of the aims of feeling.

Feeling[16]

I am unable to support the psychological school that regards feeling as a secondary phenomenon dependent upon "presentations" or sensations, . . . I regard it as an independent function sui generis.

Feeling is primarily a process that takes place between the ego and a given content, a process, moreover, that imparts to the content a definite *value* in the sense of acceptance or rejection ("like" or "dislike"); but it can also appear, as it were, isolated in the form of "mood," quite apart from the momentary contents of consciousness or momentary sensations. . . . The mood, whether it be regarded as a general or only a partial feeling, signifies a valuation; not, however, a valuation of one definite, individual, conscious content, but of the whole conscious situation at the moment, and, once again, with special reference to the question of acceptance or rejection.

Feeling, therefore, is an entirely *subjective* process, which may be in every respect independent of external stimuli, although chiming in with every sensation. Even an "indifferent" sensation possesses a "feeling tone," namely, that of indifference, which again expresses a certain valuation. Hence feeling is also a kind of *judging*, differing, however,

[16] *Ibid.*, from pp. 543-47.

from an intellectual judgment, in that it does not aim at establishing an intellectual connection but is solely concerned with the setting up of a subjective criterion of acceptance or rejection. The valuation by feeling extends to *every* content of consciousness, of whatever kind it may be. When the intensity of feeling is increased an *affect* results, which is a state of feeling accompanied by appreciable bodily innervations. Feeling is distinguished from affect by the fact that it gives rise to no perceptible physical innervations, i.e. just as much or as little as the ordinary thinking process.

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The nature of a feeling-valuation may be compared with intellectual apperception as an *apperception of value.* An *active* and a *passive* feeling-apperception can be distinguished. The passive feeling-act is characterized by the fact that a content excites or attracts the feeling; it compels a feeling-participation on the part of the subject. The active feeling-act, on the contrary, confers value from the subject—it is a deliberate evaluation of contents in accordance with feeling and not in accordance with intellectual intention. Hence active feeling is a *directed* function, an act of will, as for instance loving as opposed to being in love. This latter state would be *undirected,* passive feeling, as, indeed, the ordinary colloquial term suggests, since it describes the former as activity and the latter as a condition. Undirected feeling is *feeling-intuition.* Thus, in the stricter sense, only the active, directed feeling should be termed *rational:* the passive is definitely *irrational,* since it establishes values without voluntary participation, occasionally even against the subject's intention.

When the total attitude of the individual is orientated by the function of feeling, we speak of a feeling-type.

Sensation[17]

Sensation, or sensing, is that psychological function which transmits a physical stimulus to perception. It is, therefore, identical with perception. Sensation must be strictly distinguished from feeling, since the latter is an entirely different process, although it may, for instance, be associated with sensation as "feeling-tone." Sensation is related not only to the outer stimuli, but also to the inner, i.e. to changes in the internal organs.

Primarily, therefore, sensation is *sense-perception,* i.e. perception transmitted *via* the sense organs and "bodily senses" (kinaesthetic, vaso-motor sensation, etc.). On the one hand, it is an element of presentation, since it transmits to the presenting function the perceived

[17] *Ibid.,* from pp. 585-88.

image of the outer object; on the other hand, it is an element of feeling, because through the perception of bodily changes it lends the character of affect to feeling. Because sensation transmits physical changes to consciousness, it also represents the physiological impulse. But it is not identical with it, since it is merely a perceptive function.

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In so far as sensation is an elementary phenomenon, it is something absolutely given, something that, in contrast to thinking and feeling, is not subject to the laws of reason. I therefore term it an *irrational* function, although reason contrives to assimilate a great number of sensations into rational associations.

A man whose whole attitude is orientated by the principle of sensation belongs to the sensation type.

Intuition[18]

It is that psychological function which transmits perceptions *in an unconscious way.* Everything, whether outer or inner objects or their associations, can be the object of this perception. Intuition has this peculiar quality: it is neither sensation, nor feeling, nor intellectual conclusion, although it may appear in any of these forms. Through intuition any one content is presented as a complete whole, without our being able to explain or discover in what way this content has been arrived at. Intuition is a kind of instinctive apprehension, irrespective of the nature of its contents. Like sensation it is an *irrational* perceptive function. Its contents, like those of sensation, have the character of being given, in contrast to the "derived" or "deduced" character of feeling and thinking contents. Intuitive cognition, therefore, possesses an intrinsic character of certainty and conviction which enabled Spinoza to uphold the "scientia intuitiva" as the highest form of cognition. (Similarly Bergson). Intuition has this quality in common with sensation, whose physical foundation is the ground and origin of its certitude. In the same way, the certainty of intuition depends upon a definite psychic matter of fact, of whose origin and state of readiness, however, the subject was quite unconscious.

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Intuition maintains a compensatory function to sensation, and, like sensation, it is the maternal soil from which thinking and feeling are developed in the form of rational functions. Intuition is an irrational function, notwithstanding the fact that many intuitions may subsequently be split up into their component elements, whereby their origin and appearance can also be made to harmonize with the laws of reason.

[18] *Ibid.*, from pp. 567-69.

Everyone whose general attitude is orientated by the principle of intuition, i.e. perception by way of the unconscious, belongs to the *intuitive type.*

According to the manner in which intuition is employed, whether directed within in the service of cognition and inner perception or without in the service of action and accomplishment, the introverted and extraverted intuitive types can be differentiated.

PSYCHIC ENERGY (LIBIDO)[19]

The theory of libido which I have advanced has met with many misunderstandings and, in some quarters, complete repudiation; it may therefore not be amiss if I again take up the fundamental concepts of this theory.

It is a generally recognized truth that physical events can be looked at in two ways, that is, from the mechanistic and from the energic standpoint. The mechanistic view is purely causal; from this standpoint an event is conceived as the result of a cause, in the sense that immutable substances change their relationships to one another according to fixed laws.

The energic view-point on the other hand is in essence final: the event is traced from effect to cause on the assumption that energy forms the essential basis of changes in phenomena, that it maintains itself as a constant throughout these changes, and finally leads to an entrophy, a condition of general equilibrium. The flow of energy has a definite direction (goal), in that it follows the fall of potential in a way that cannot be reversed. The idea of energy is not that of a substance moved in space; it is a concept abstracted from relations of movement. The concept, therefore, is not founded on substances themselves, but on their relations; while the moving substance itself is the basis of the mechanistic theory.

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I am in hearty agreement with von Grot—one of the first to propose the concept of psychic energy—when he says: "The idea of psychic energy is as much justified in science as is that of physical energy, and psychic energy equally with physical energy has quantitative measurements and a variety of forms."

The Subjective System of Values

The applicability of the energic standpoint to psychology rests, then, exclusively upon the question as to whether a quantitative evaluation of

[19] "On Psychical Energy," in *Contributions to Analytical Psychology*, trans. H. G. and Cary F. Baines (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1928), from pp. 1-32.

psychic energy is possible. This question is to be met with unconditional affirmation, because our minds possess what is in fact an exceedingly well-developed evaluating system, namely, the *system of psychological values*. Values are indices of amounts of energy. Here it is to be noted that in the collective moral and aesthetic values we have at our disposal an objective system that is not merely one of values but also of measure. This system of measure is certainly not immediately available for our purposes, for it is a generally established scale of values which takes account, in an indirect way only, of subjective, that is, individual psychological conditions.

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We can weigh our subjective valuations one against the other and determine their *relative* strength. The measure of them is certainly relative to the value of other contents, and therefore not absolute and objective, but it is sufficient for our purpose, inasmuch as different intensities of value within similar qualities can be recognized with confidence, while equal values under the same conditions plainly maintain themselves in equilibrium.... In subjective evaluation feeling and insight are of immediate assistance, because feeling is a function that has been developing through an inconceivably long period of time, and has become most firmly differentiated.

The Objective Measure of Quantity

In the study of the phenomena of association I have shown that there are certain groupings of psychic elements about emotionally-toned contents, which have been called complexes. The emotionally-toned content, the complex, consists of a nuclear element and a great number of secondarily constellated associations. The nucleus is made up of two components, first, a condition determined by experience, an event in other words, that is causally related to the environment, and, secondly, a condition innate in the individual character, that is, determined by disposition.

The nuclear element is characterized by the so-called feeling tone, or the emphasis given through affect. This stress, expressed in terms of energy, is a value quantity. In so far as the nuclear element is conscious, the quantity can be subjectively estimated, at least relatively. But if, as frequently happens, the nuclear element is unconscious, or at least unconscious in its psychological significance, then the subjective evaluation is impossible, and one must substitute the indirect method of arriving at the value. This indirect method rests in principle on the following facts: the nuclear element creates a complex automatically so far as it is affectively toned, that is, possessed of energic value. I have shown this in detail in the second and third chapters of my *Psychology of*

Dementia Praecox. The nuclear element has a constellating power corresponding to its energic value. From this power there follows a specific constellation of the psychic contents; and thus is developed the complex, which is a constellation of psychic contents dynamically conditioned by the energic value. The resulting constellation, however, is not a simple irradiation of the stimulus, but a selection of stimulated psychic contents, conditioned by the quality of the nuclear element—a selection which naturally cannot be explained on an energic basis, because the energic explanation is quantitative and not qualitative. For a qualitative explanation we must have recourse to the causal viewpoint. The statement, then, upon which the objective estimation of psychological value-intensities is founded, runs as follows: the constellating power of the nuclear element corresponds to its value intensity, which in turn represents its energy.

But what means have we of estimating in its energic value the constellating power that can enrich a complex with associations? We can estimate this amount of energy in various ways:—

(1) from the relative number of constellations effected by the nuclear element;

(2) from the relative frequency and intensity of the so-called disturbance- or complex-indices;

(3) from the intensity of accompanying affect-phenomena.

1. The data required to determine the relative number of constellations effected by the nuclear element may be obtained in part through direct observation, and in part by means of analytical deductions. The rule of our estimate is: the more frequently we come upon constellations that are conditioned by one and the same complex, the greater must be the psychological value that we assign to this complex.

2. By the disturbance- or complex-indices we must not understand merely the indicators that appear in the association experiments. These are really nothing but complex-effects, the form of which is determined by the special situation of the experiment....

3. For the determination of the intensity of affective phenomena we have objective methods which, though not measuring the amount of the affect, still permit an estimation. Experimental psychology has given us a string of such methods. Apart from time measurements, which determine the inhibition in the association-process rather than the actual affect, we have in particular the following means:—

(a) the pulse curve.

(b) the respiration curve.

(c) the psycho-galvanic phenomenon.

The easily recognizable changes in these curves permit estimates to be made concerning the intensity of the disturbing cause. It is possible, as experience has sufficiently shown, to induce affect-phenomena in the person experimented upon by means of intentional psychological stim-

uli, which one knows to be especially stressed with affect for the particular individual in his relation to the experimenter.

The Conservation of Energy

If we undertake to view the psychical life-processes from the energic standpoint, we must not be content with mere theory, but must take up the task of testing its applicability to empirical material. An energic view-point is superfluous if its main principle, that of the conservation of energy, proves inapplicable. We must follow here the recommendation of Busse, and distinguish between the principle of equivalence and that of constancy. The equivalence principle states that "for every energy spent or consumed in bringing about a condition, a similar quantity of the same or other forms of energy shall appear elsewhere"; the constancy principle is to the effect that "the sum total of energy remains constant, and is neither susceptible of increase, nor of decrease." The constancy principle is therefore a logically necessary but generalized inference from the equivalence principle; it has no practical significance, since our experience is based only on relative systems. Thus, for our task, the equivalence principle is the only one of immediate concern.

Entropy

The principle of equivalence is one practically important postulate in the theory of energy; the other necessary complementary position is the principle of entropy. Transformations of energy are possible only as a result of differences in intensity. According to the statement of Carnot, heat can be transformed into work only by passing from a warmer to a colder body, but mechanical work is continually being transformed into heat, which on account of its diminished intensity cannot be re-transformed into work again. In this way a closed energic system gradually reduces its differences in intensity to an even temperature, whereby any further change is prohibited. This is the so-called death in "trepidity."

The principle of entropy is known in experience only as a principle of partial processes which make up a relatively closed system. The psyche can be regarded as such a relatively closed system, in which the transpositions of energy also lead to an equilization of differences. According to Boltzmann's formulation, this levelling process corresponds to a transition from an improbable to a probable condition, but with an increasing limitation of the possibilities of further change. We see this process, for example, in the development of a lasting and relatively unchanging attitude. After violent oscillations at the beginning the contradictions balance each other, and gradually a new attitude develops, the final stability of which is the greater in proportion to the magnitude of the initial differences. The greater the tension between the pairs of oppo-

sites, the greater the energy, the stronger will be its constellating, attracting power. This greater attracting power represents a wider range of constellated psychical material, and the further this range extends, the less chance there is of later disturbances that might arise from differences with the material not previously constellated. For this reason an attitude that has been formed out of a far-reaching process of equalization is an especially lasting one. Daily psychological experience offers proof of this statement. Most intense conflicts, if overcome, leave behind a sense of security and rest, or a brokenness, that it is scarcely possible to disturb again, or to cure, as the case may be.... Since our experience is confined to relatively closed systems,[b] we are never in the position to observe an absolute psychological entropy; but the more complete the isolation of the psychological system is, the more clearly is the phenomenon of entropy manifested. We can see this particularly well in those mental disturbances which are characterized by an extreme seclusion from the environment. The so-called "dulling of affect" of dementia praecox, of schizophrenia, is to be understood as a phenomenon of entropy. The same also applies to those so-called degenerative phenomena which develop into psychological attitudes that permanently exclude all connexions with the world around. Similarly, such voluntary directed processes as directed thought or feeling can be viewed as relatively closed psychological systems. These functions are based on the principle of the exclusion of the inappropriate, or unsuitable, which could bring about a deviation from the chosen way. The elements that "belong" are protected from outside, disturbing influences. Thus after some time they reach their "probable" condition, which manifests its firmness, for example, in a "lasting" conviction, or in a "deeply ingrained" view-point, etc. How firmly rooted such things are can be tested by anyone who attempts to dissolve such a structure, for example, to uproot a prejudice, or change a habit of thought. In the history of peoples such changes have cost rivers of blood. But in so far as an absolute closing off is impossible (pathological cases excepted) the energic process goes on as development, though, because of "loss by friction," with lessening intensity and decreased potential.

This way of looking at things has long been familiar. Everybody speaks of the "storms of youth" which yield to the "tranquility of age." We speak too of a "strengthened opinion" after "battling with doubts," of a "relief from inner tension," etc. This is the arbitrary energic standpoint shared by everyone. This standpoint remains valueless to the scientific psychologist as long as he feels no need of estimating psychological values. For physiological psychology the problem does not come into question at all.

[b]A system is absolutely closed when energy from without can no longer be fed into it. Only in such a case can entrophy occur.

Energism and Dynamism

The psychological concept of energy is not a pure concept, but also a concrete and applied concept, that appears in the form of sexual, vital, mental, moral "energy"; in other words it appears in the form of instinct, the undeniably dynamic nature of which justifies us in a conceptual parallelism with physical forces....

I have advocated calling the energy-concept used in analytical psychology by the name "libido." The choice of the word may not be ideal in some ways, yet it seems to me that this concept merits the name libido as a matter of historical justice.... Since Freud confines himself exclusively to sexuality and its manifold ramifications in the mind, the sexual definition of energy as a specific instinctive force is quite sufficient for his purpose. In a general psychological theory, however, it is impossible to use sexuality, that is, one specific instinct, as an explanatory concept, since psychical energy-transformation is not merely a matter of sexual dynamics. Sexual dynamics is only a special case in a general theory of mind. When so regarded its existence is not denied, but merely given its proper place.

Since the applied theory of energy immediately becomes hypostasized on perceptual grounds into the forces of the mind (instincts, affects, and other dynamic processes), the perceived manifestation of psychic energy is in my opinion excellently characterized by the word "libido"; inasmuch as similar perceptions have always made use of like terms, as, for example, Schopenhauer's "will," the *horme* of Aristotle, the *eros* of the elements, or the *élan vital* of Bergson. From these concepts I have taken only the graphic or perceptual character of my term, not the definition of the concept.

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With the word "libido" I do not connect, as I said, a sexual definition, yet it must not therefore be inferred that I exclude a sexual dynamism, more than any other dynamism, as, for example, that of the hunger instinct. In my book, *The Psychology of the Unconscious*, I called attention to my notion of a general life instinct, termed libido, which replaces the concept "psychic energy" that I used in the *Psychology of Dementia Praecox*.

The Individuation Process[20]

I use the term "individuation" to denote the process by which a person becomes a psychological "in-dividual," that is, a separate,

[20]"Conscious, Unconscious, and Individuation," in *Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious*, *op. cit.*, from pp. 275-89.

indivisible unity or "whole." It is generally assumed that consciousness is the whole of the psychological individual. But knowledge of the phenomena that can only be explained on the hypothesis of unconscious psychic processes makes it doubtful whether the ego and its contents are in fact identical with the "whole." If unconscious processes exist at all, they must surely belong to the totality of the individual, even though they are not components of the conscious ego. If they were part of the ego they would necessarily be conscious, because everything that is directly related to the ego is conscious. Consciousness can even be equated with the relation between the ego and the psychic contents. But unconscious phenomena are so little related to the ego that most people do not hesitate to deny their existence outright. Nevertheless, they manifest themselves in an individual's behaviour. An attentive observer can detect them without difficulty, while the observed person remains quite unaware of the fact that he is betraying his most secret thoughts or even things he has never thought consciously. It is, however, a great prejudice to suppose that something we have never thought consciously does not exist in the psyche. There is plenty of evidence to show that consciousness is very far from covering the psyche in its totality. Many things occur semiconsciously, and a great many more remain entirely unconscious. Thorough investigation of the phenomena of dual and multiple personalities, for instance, has brought to light a mass of material with observations to prove this point.

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Consciousness grows out of an unconscious psyche which is older than it, and which goes on functioning together with it or even in spite of it. Although there are numerous cases of conscious contents becoming unconscious again (through being repressed, for instance), the unconscious as a whole is far from being a mere remnant of consciousness. Or are the psychic functions of animals remnants of consciousness?

As I have said, there is little hope of finding in the unconscious an order equivalent to that of the ego. It certainly does not look as if we were likely to discover an unconscious ego-personality.... Just as a human mother can only produce a human child, whose deepest nature lay hidden during its potential existence within her, so we are practically compelled to believe that the unconscious cannot be an entirely chaotic accumulation of instincts and images. There must be something to hold it together and give expression to the whole. Its centre cannot possibly be the ego, since the ego was born out of it into consciousness and turns its back on the unconscious, seeking to shut it out as much as possible. Or can it be that the unconscious loses its centre with the birth of the ego? In that case we would expect the ego to be far superior to the unconscious in influence and importance. The unconscious would then

follow meekly in the footsteps of the conscious and that would be just what we wish.

Unfortunately, the facts show the exact opposite: consciousness succumbs all too easily to unconscious influences, and these are often truer and wiser than our conscious thinking. Also, it frequently happens that unconscious motives overrule our conscious decisions. . . . Another example is intuition, which is chiefly dependent on unconscious processes of a very complex nature. Because of this peculiarity, I have defined intuition as "perception via the unconscious."

Normally the unconscious collaborates with the conscious without friction or disturbance, so that one is not even aware of its existence. But when an individual or a social group deviates too far from their instinctual foundations, they then experience the full impact of unconscious forces.

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Consciousness needs a centre, an ego to which something is conscious. We know of no other kind of consciousness, nor can we imagine a consciousness without an ego. There can be no consciousness when there is no one to say: "*I* am conscious." . . . It was never possible for me to discover in the unconscious anything like a personality comparable with the ego. But although a "second ego" cannot be discovered (except in the rare case of dual personality), the manifestations of the unconscious do at least show *traces of personalities. . . . Personality need not imply consciousness. It can just as easily be dormant or dreaming.*

The general aspect of unconscious manifestations is in the main chaotic and irrational, despite certain symptoms of intelligence and purposiveness. The unconscious produces dreams, visions, fantasies, emotions, grotesque ideas, and so forth. This is exactly what we would expect a dreaming personality to do. It seems to be a personality that was never awake and was never conscious of the life it had lived and of its own continuity. The only question is whether the hypothesis of a dormant and hidden personality is possible or not.

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I am convinced that such evidence exists. Unfortunately, the material to prove this belongs to the subtleties of psychological analysis. . . . I shall begin with a brief statement: in the unconscious of every man there is hidden a feminine personality, and in that of every woman a masculine personality.

It is a well-known fact that sex is determined by a majority of male or female genes, as the case may be. But the minority of genes belonging to the other sex does not simply disappear. A man therefore has in him a feminine side, an unconscious feminine figure—a fact of which he is

generally quite unaware. I may take it as known that I have called this figure the "anima," and its counterpart in a woman the "animus." . . .

Another, no less important and clearly defined figure is the "shadow." Like the anima, it appears either in projection on suitable persons, or personified as such in dreams. The shadow coincides with the "personal" unconscious (which corresponds to Freud's conception of the unconscious). . . . The shadow personifies everything that the subject refuses to acknowledge about himself and yet is always thrusting itself upon him directly or indirectly—for instance, inferior traits of character and other incompatible tendencies.

The fact that the unconscious spontaneously personifies certain affectively toned contents in dreams is the reason why I have taken over these personifications in my terminology and formulated them as names.

Besides these figures there are still a few others, less frequent and less striking, which have likewise undergone poetic as well as mythological formulation. I would mention, for instance, the figure of the hero and of the wise old man, to name only two of the best known. All these figures irrupt autonomously into consciousness as soon as it gets into a pathological state.

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The unconscious psyche is not only immensely old, it is also capable of growing into an equally remote future. It moulds the human species and is just as much a part of it as the human body, which, though ephemeral in the individual, is collectively of immense age.

The anima and animus live in a world quite different from the world outside—in a world where the pulse of time beats infinitely slowly, where the birth and death of individuals count for little. No wonder their nature is strange, so strange that their irruption into consciousness often amounts to a psychosis. They undoubtedly belong to the material that comes to light in schizophrenia.

What I have said about the collective unconscious may give you a more or less adequate idea of what I mean by this term. If we now turn back to the problem of individuation, we shall see ourselves faced with a rather extraordinary task: the psyche consists of two incongruous halves which together should form a whole. One is inclined to think that ego-consciousness is capable of assimilating the unconscious, at least one hopes that such a solution is possible. But unfortunately the unconscious really is unconscious; in other words, it is unknown. And how can you assimilate something unknown? Even if you can form a fairly complete picture of the anima and animus, this does not mean that you have plumbed the depths of the unconscious. One hopes to control the unconscious, but the past masters in the art of self-control, the yogis, attain perfection in *samādhi*, a state of ecstasy, which so far as we know is equivalent to a state of unconsciousness. It makes no difference

whether they call our unconscious a "universal consciousness;" the fact remains that in their case the unconscious has swallowed up ego-consciousness. They do not realize that a "universal consciousness" is a contradiction in terms, since exclusion, selection, and discrimination are the root and essence of everything that lays claim to the name "consciousness." "Universal consciousness" is logically identical with unconsciousness.

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We believe in ego-consciousness and in what we call reality. . . . Our European ego-consciousness is therefore inclined to swallow up the unconscious, and if this should not prove feasible we try to suppress it. But if we understand anything of the unconscious, we know that it cannot be swallowed. We also know that it is dangerous to suppress it, because the unconscious is life and this life turns against us if suppressed, as happens in neurosis.

Conscious and unconscious do not make a whole when one of them is suppressed and injured by the other. If they must contend, let it at least be a fair fight with equal rights on both sides. Both are aspects of life. Consciousness should defend its reason and protect itself, and the chaotic life of the unconscious should be given the chance of having its way too—as much of it as we can stand. This means open conflict and open collaboration at once. That, evidently, is the way human life should be. It is the old game of hammer and anvil: between them the patient iron is forged into an indestructible whole, an "individual."

This, roughly, is what I mean by the individuation process. As the name shows, it is a process or course of development arising out of the conflict between the two fundamental psychic facts. . . . How the harmonizing of conscious and unconscious data is to be undertaken cannot be indicated in the form of a recipe. It is an irrational life-process which expresses itself in definite symbols. It may be the task of the analyst to stand by this process with all the help he can give. In this case, knowledge of the symbols is indispensable, for it is in them that the union of conscious and unconscious contents is consummated. Out of this union emerge new situations and new conscious attitudes. I have therefore called the union of opposites the "transcendent function." This rounding out of the personality into a whole may well be the goal of any psychotherapy that claims to be more than a mere cure of symptoms.